| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Functions for querying, manipulating and locking rollback indices |
| * stored in the TPM NVRAM. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <security/vboot/antirollback.h> |
| #include <security/vboot/tpm_common.h> |
| #include <security/tpm/tspi.h> |
| #include <security/tpm/tss.h> |
| #include <security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_structures.h> |
| #include <security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_structures.h> |
| #include <vb2_api.h> |
| #include <console/console.h> |
| |
| #define VBDEBUG(format, args...) \ |
| printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s():%d: " format, __func__, __LINE__, ## args) |
| |
| #define RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_cmd) do { \ |
| uint32_t result_; \ |
| if ((result_ = (tpm_cmd)) != TPM_SUCCESS) { \ |
| VBDEBUG("Antirollback: %08x returned by " #tpm_cmd \ |
| "\n", (int)result_); \ |
| return result_; \ |
| } \ |
| } while (0) |
| |
| static uint32_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length); |
| |
| static uint32_t read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, |
| ctx->secdata_firmware, |
| VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE)); |
| return TPM_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t antirollback_read_space_kernel(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| if (!CONFIG(TPM2)) { |
| /* |
| * Before reading the kernel space, verify its permissions. If |
| * the kernel space has the wrong permission, we give up. This |
| * will need to be fixed by the recovery kernel. We will have |
| * to worry about this because at any time (even with PP turned |
| * off) the TPM owner can remove and redefine a PP-protected |
| * space (but not write to it). |
| */ |
| uint32_t perms; |
| |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_get_permissions(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, |
| &perms)); |
| if (perms != TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE) { |
| printk(BIOS_ERR, |
| "TPM: invalid secdata_kernel permissions\n"); |
| return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t size = VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_SIZE; |
| uint32_t ret; |
| |
| /* Start with the version 1.0 size used by all modern cr50-boards. */ |
| ret = tlcl_read(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel, size); |
| if (ret == TPM_E_RANGE) { |
| /* Fallback to version 0.2(minimum) size and re-read. */ |
| VBDEBUG("Antirollback: NV read out of range, trying min size\n"); |
| size = VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_MIN_SIZE; |
| ret = tlcl_read(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel, size); |
| } |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(ret); |
| |
| if (vb2api_secdata_kernel_check(ctx, &size) == VB2_ERROR_SECDATA_KERNEL_INCOMPLETE) |
| /* Re-read. vboot will run the check and handle errors. */ |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel, size)); |
| |
| return TPM_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| #if CONFIG(TPM2) |
| |
| static uint32_t read_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index, uint8_t *data) |
| { |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(index, data, |
| HASH_NV_SIZE)); |
| return TPM_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This is used to initialize the TPM space for recovery hash after defining |
| * it. Since there is no data available to calculate hash at the point where TPM |
| * space is defined, initialize it to all 0s. |
| */ |
| static const uint8_t mrc_hash_data[HASH_NV_SIZE] = { }; |
| |
| /* |
| * Different sets of NVRAM space attributes apply to the "ro" spaces, |
| * i.e. those which should not be possible to delete or modify once |
| * the RO exits, and the rest of the NVRAM spaces. |
| */ |
| static const TPMA_NV ro_space_attributes = { |
| .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1, |
| }; |
| |
| static const TPMA_NV rw_space_attributes = { |
| .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1, |
| }; |
| |
| static const TPMA_NV rw_auth_space_attributes = { |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1, |
| }; |
| |
| static const TPMA_NV fwmp_attr = { |
| .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1, |
| }; |
| |
| /* Attributes for spaces that enable zero-touch enrollment (ZTE) */ |
| static const TPMA_NV zte_attr = { |
| .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1, |
| }; |
| |
| static const TPMA_NV zte_rma_bytes_attr = { |
| .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_BITS = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1, |
| }; |
| |
| static const TPMA_NV rw_orderly_counter_attributes = { |
| .TPMA_NV_COUNTER = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_ORDERLY = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1, |
| .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1, |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * This policy digest was obtained using TPM2_PolicyOR on 3 digests |
| * corresponding to a sequence of |
| * -) TPM2_PolicyCommandCode(TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial), |
| * -) TPM2_PolicyPCR(PCR0, <extended_value>). |
| * where <extended value> is |
| * 1) all zeros = initial, unextended state: |
| * - Value to extend to initial PCR0: |
| * <none> |
| * - Resulting PCR0: |
| * 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
| * - Policy digest for PolicyCommandCode + PolicyPCR: |
| * 4B44FC4192DB5AD7167E0135708FD374890A06BFB56317DF01F24F2226542A3F |
| * 2) result of extending (SHA1(0x00|0x01|0x00) | 00s to SHA256 size) |
| * - Value to extend to initial PCR0: |
| * 62571891215b4efc1ceab744ce59dd0b66ea6f73000000000000000000000000 |
| * - Resulting PCR0: |
| * 9F9EA866D3F34FE3A3112AE9CB1FBABC6FFE8CD261D42493BC6842A9E4F93B3D |
| * - Policy digest for PolicyCommandCode + PolicyPCR: |
| * CB5C8014E27A5F7586AAE42DB4F9776A977BCBC952CA61E33609DA2B2C329418 |
| * 3) result of extending (SHA1(0x01|0x01|0x00) | 00s to SHA256 size) |
| * - Value to extend to initial PCR0: |
| * 47ec8d98366433dc002e7721c9e37d5067547937000000000000000000000000 |
| * - Resulting PCR0: |
| * 2A7580E5DA289546F4D2E0509CC6DE155EA131818954D36D49E027FD42B8C8F8 |
| * - Policy digest for PolicyCommandCode + PolicyPCR: |
| * E6EF4F0296AC3EF0F53906480985B1BE8058E0E517E5F74A5B8A415EFE339D87 |
| * Values #2 and #3 correspond to two forms of recovery mode as extended by |
| * vb2api_get_pcr_digest(). |
| * As a result, the digest allows deleting the space with UndefineSpaceSpecial |
| * at early RO stages (before extending PCR0) or from recovery mode. |
| */ |
| static const uint8_t pcr0_allowed_policy[] = { |
| 0x44, 0x44, 0x79, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0x3F, 0x5B, 0x15, 0x76, 0x56, |
| 0x50, 0xEF, 0x96, 0x98, 0x0A, 0x2B, 0x96, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0x09, 0x04, |
| 0x4A, 0x01, 0xB8, 0x5F, 0xA5, 0x4A, 0x96, 0xFC, 0x59, 0x84}; |
| |
| static const uint8_t unsatisfiable_policy[VB2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE] = |
| "hmwhat if RBR beat merc in 2021"; |
| |
| static uint32_t define_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, uint32_t length, |
| const TPMA_NV nv_attributes, |
| const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size) |
| { |
| uint32_t rv; |
| |
| rv = tlcl_define_space(index, length, nv_attributes, nv_policy, |
| nv_policy_size); |
| if (rv == TPM_E_NV_DEFINED) { |
| /* |
| * Continue with writing: it may be defined, but not written |
| * to. In that case a subsequent tlcl_read() would still return |
| * TPM_E_BADINDEX on TPM 2.0. The cases when some non-firmware |
| * space is defined while the firmware space is not there |
| * should be rare (interrupted initialization), so no big harm |
| * in writing once again even if it was written already. |
| */ |
| VBDEBUG("%s: %s space already exists\n", __func__, name); |
| rv = TPM_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| /* Nothing special in the TPM2 path yet. */ |
| static uint32_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length) |
| { |
| return tlcl_write(index, data, length); |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t setup_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, const void *data, |
| uint32_t length, const TPMA_NV nv_attributes, |
| const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size) |
| { |
| uint32_t rv; |
| |
| rv = define_space(name, index, length, nv_attributes, nv_policy, |
| nv_policy_size); |
| if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS) |
| return rv; |
| |
| return safe_write(index, data, length); |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t setup_firmware_space(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| uint32_t firmware_space_size = vb2api_secdata_firmware_create(ctx); |
| |
| return setup_space("firmware", FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, |
| ctx->secdata_firmware, firmware_space_size, |
| ro_space_attributes, pcr0_allowed_policy, |
| sizeof(pcr0_allowed_policy)); |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t setup_fwmp_space(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| uint32_t fwmp_space_size = vb2api_secdata_fwmp_create(ctx); |
| |
| return setup_space("FWMP", FWMP_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_fwmp, fwmp_space_size, |
| fwmp_attr, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t setup_kernel_space(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| uint32_t kernel_space_size = vb2api_secdata_kernel_create(ctx); |
| |
| return setup_space("kernel", KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel, |
| kernel_space_size, rw_space_attributes, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t set_mrc_hash_space(uint32_t index, const uint8_t *data) |
| { |
| if (index == MRC_REC_HASH_NV_INDEX) { |
| return setup_space("RO MRC Hash", index, data, HASH_NV_SIZE, |
| ro_space_attributes, pcr0_allowed_policy, |
| sizeof(pcr0_allowed_policy)); |
| } else { |
| return setup_space("RW MRC Hash", index, data, HASH_NV_SIZE, |
| rw_space_attributes, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Set up the Zero-Touch Enrollment(ZTE) related spaces. |
| * |
| * These spaces are not used by firmware, but we do need to initialize them. |
| */ |
| static uint32_t setup_zte_spaces(void) |
| { |
| uint32_t rv; |
| uint64_t rma_bytes_counter_default = 0; |
| uint8_t rma_sn_bits_default[16]; |
| uint8_t board_id_default[12]; |
| |
| /* Initialize defaults: Board ID and RMA+SN Bits must be initialized |
| to all 0xFFs. */ |
| memset(rma_sn_bits_default, 0xFF, ARRAY_SIZE(rma_sn_bits_default)); |
| memset(board_id_default, 0xFF, ARRAY_SIZE(board_id_default)); |
| |
| /* Set up RMA + SN Bits */ |
| rv = setup_space("RMA + SN Bits", ZTE_RMA_SN_BITS_INDEX, |
| rma_sn_bits_default, sizeof(rma_sn_bits_default), |
| zte_attr, |
| unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy)); |
| if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS) { |
| VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to set up RMA + SN Bits space\n", __func__); |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| rv = setup_space("Board ID", ZTE_BOARD_ID_NV_INDEX, |
| board_id_default, sizeof(board_id_default), |
| zte_attr, |
| unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy)); |
| if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS) { |
| VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to set up Board ID space\n", __func__); |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| /* Set up RMA Bytes counter */ |
| rv = define_space("RMA Bytes Counter", ZTE_RMA_BYTES_COUNTER_INDEX, |
| sizeof(rma_bytes_counter_default), |
| zte_rma_bytes_attr, |
| unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy)); |
| if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS) { |
| VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to define RMA Bytes space\n", __func__); |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Since the RMA counter has the BITS attribute, we need to call |
| * TPM2_NV_SetBits() in order to initialize it. |
| */ |
| rv = tlcl_set_bits(ZTE_RMA_BYTES_COUNTER_INDEX, |
| rma_bytes_counter_default); |
| if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS) { |
| VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to init RMA Bytes counter space\n", |
| __func__); |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set up enterprise rollback space. |
| * |
| * This space is not used by firmware but needs to survive owner clear. Thus, it |
| * needs to be created here. |
| */ |
| static uint32_t enterprise_rollback_create_space(void) |
| { |
| uint8_t rollback_space_default[32] = {0}; |
| |
| return setup_space("Enterprise Rollback Space", |
| ENT_ROLLBACK_SPACE_INDEX, rollback_space_default, |
| sizeof(rollback_space_default), rw_auth_space_attributes, |
| unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy)); |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t setup_widevine_counter_spaces(void) |
| { |
| uint32_t index, rv; |
| |
| for (index = 0; index < NUM_WIDEVINE_COUNTERS; index++) { |
| rv = define_space(WIDEVINE_COUNTER_NAME, WIDEVINE_COUNTER_NV_INDEX(index), |
| WIDEVINE_COUNTER_SIZE, rw_orderly_counter_attributes, NULL, 0); |
| if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS) |
| return rv; |
| } |
| return TPM_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_force_clear()); |
| |
| /* |
| * Of all NVRAM spaces defined by this function the firmware space |
| * must be defined last, because its existence is considered an |
| * indication that TPM factory initialization was successfully |
| * completed. |
| */ |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_kernel_space(ctx)); |
| |
| /* |
| * Define and set rec hash space, if available. No need to |
| * create the RW hash space because we will definitely boot |
| * once in normal mode before shipping, meaning that the space |
| * will get created with correct permissions while still in |
| * our hands. |
| */ |
| if (CONFIG(VBOOT_HAS_REC_HASH_SPACE)) |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(set_mrc_hash_space(MRC_REC_HASH_NV_INDEX, mrc_hash_data)); |
| |
| /* Define and write firmware management parameters space. */ |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_fwmp_space(ctx)); |
| |
| /* |
| * Define and write zero-touch enrollment (ZTE) spaces. For Cr50 devices, |
| * these are set up elsewhere via TPM vendor commands. |
| */ |
| if (CONFIG(CHROMEOS) && !(CONFIG(TPM_GOOGLE))) |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_zte_spaces()); |
| |
| /* |
| * On TPM 2.0, create a space that survives TPM clear. This allows to |
| * securely lock data during enterprise rollback by binding to this |
| * space's value. |
| */ |
| if (CONFIG(CHROMEOS)) |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(enterprise_rollback_create_space()); |
| |
| /* Define widevine counter space. No need to increment/write to the secure counters |
| and are expected to be incremented during the first use. */ |
| if (CONFIG(VBOOT_DEFINE_WIDEVINE_COUNTERS)) |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_widevine_counter_spaces()); |
| |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_firmware_space(ctx)); |
| |
| return TPM_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_firmware(void) |
| { |
| return tlcl_lock_nv_write(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX); |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t antirollback_read_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index, uint8_t *data, uint32_t size) |
| { |
| if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) { |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for hash idx 0x%x. " |
| "(Expected=0x%x Actual=0x%x).\n", index, HASH_NV_SIZE, |
| size); |
| return TPM_E_READ_FAILURE; |
| } |
| return read_space_mrc_hash(index, data); |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t antirollback_write_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t size) |
| { |
| uint8_t spc_data[HASH_NV_SIZE]; |
| uint32_t rv; |
| |
| if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) { |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for hash idx 0x%x. " |
| "(Expected=0x%x Actual=0x%x).\n", index, HASH_NV_SIZE, |
| size); |
| return TPM_E_WRITE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| rv = read_space_mrc_hash(index, spc_data); |
| if (rv == TPM_E_BADINDEX) { |
| /* |
| * If space is not defined already for hash, define |
| * new space. |
| */ |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: Initializing hash space.\n"); |
| return set_mrc_hash_space(index, data); |
| } |
| |
| if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS) |
| return rv; |
| |
| return safe_write(index, data, size); |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index) |
| { |
| return tlcl_lock_nv_write(index); |
| } |
| |
| #else |
| |
| /** |
| * Like tlcl_write(), but checks for write errors due to hitting the 64-write |
| * limit and clears the TPM when that happens. This can only happen when the |
| * TPM is unowned, so it is OK to clear it (and we really have no choice). |
| * This is not expected to happen frequently, but it could happen. |
| */ |
| |
| static uint32_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length) |
| { |
| uint32_t result = tlcl_write(index, data, length); |
| if (result == TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES) { |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable()); |
| return tlcl_write(index, data, length); |
| } else { |
| return result; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Similarly to safe_write(), this ensures we don't fail a DefineSpace because |
| * we hit the TPM write limit. This is even less likely to happen than with |
| * writes because we only define spaces once at initialization, but we'd |
| * rather be paranoid about this. |
| */ |
| static uint32_t safe_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size) |
| { |
| uint32_t result = tlcl_define_space(index, perm, size); |
| if (result == TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES) { |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable()); |
| return tlcl_define_space(index, perm, size); |
| } else { |
| return result; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS pflags; |
| uint32_t result; |
| |
| vb2api_secdata_firmware_create(ctx); |
| vb2api_secdata_kernel_create_v0(ctx); |
| |
| result = tlcl_get_permanent_flags(&pflags); |
| if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) |
| return result; |
| |
| /* |
| * TPM may come from the factory without physical presence finalized. |
| * Fix if necessary. |
| */ |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: physicalPresenceLifetimeLock=%d\n", |
| pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock); |
| if (!pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock) { |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: Finalizing physical presence\n"); |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_finalize_physical_presence()); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The TPM will not enforce the NV authorization restrictions until the |
| * execution of a TPM_NV_DefineSpace with the handle of |
| * TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK. Here we create that space if it doesn't already |
| * exist. */ |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: nvLocked=%d\n", pflags.nvLocked); |
| if (!pflags.nvLocked) { |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: Enabling NV locking\n"); |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_set_nv_locked()); |
| } |
| |
| /* Clear TPM owner, in case the TPM is already owned for some reason. */ |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: Clearing owner\n"); |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable()); |
| |
| /* Define and write secdata_kernel space. */ |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_define_space(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, |
| TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE, |
| VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_SIZE_V02)); |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_write(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, |
| ctx->secdata_kernel, |
| VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_SIZE_V02)); |
| |
| /* Define and write secdata_firmware space. */ |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_define_space(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, |
| TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK | |
| TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE, |
| VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE)); |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_write(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, |
| ctx->secdata_firmware, |
| VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE)); |
| |
| return TPM_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_firmware(void) |
| { |
| return tlcl_set_global_lock(); |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| /** |
| * Perform one-time initializations. |
| * |
| * Create the NVRAM spaces, and set their initial values as needed. Sets the |
| * nvLocked bit and ensures the physical presence command is enabled and |
| * locked. |
| */ |
| static uint32_t factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| uint32_t result; |
| |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: factory initialization\n"); |
| |
| /* |
| * Do a full test. This only happens the first time the device is |
| * turned on in the factory, so performance is not an issue. This is |
| * almost certainly not necessary, but it gives us more confidence |
| * about some code paths below that are difficult to |
| * test---specifically the ones that set lifetime flags, and are only |
| * executed once per physical TPM. |
| */ |
| result = tlcl_self_test_full(); |
| if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) |
| return result; |
| |
| result = _factory_initialize_tpm(ctx); |
| if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) |
| return result; |
| |
| /* _factory_initialize_tpm() writes initial secdata values to TPM |
| immediately, so let vboot know that it's up to date now. */ |
| ctx->flags &= ~(VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_CHANGED | |
| VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_KERNEL_CHANGED); |
| |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: factory initialization successful\n"); |
| |
| return TPM_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t antirollback_read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| uint32_t rv; |
| |
| /* Read the firmware space. */ |
| rv = read_space_firmware(ctx); |
| if (rv == TPM_E_BADINDEX) { |
| /* This seems the first time we've run. Initialize the TPM. */ |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: Not initialized yet.\n"); |
| RETURN_ON_FAILURE(factory_initialize_tpm(ctx)); |
| } else if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS) { |
| VBDEBUG("TPM: Firmware space in a bad state; giving up.\n"); |
| return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; |
| } |
| |
| return TPM_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t antirollback_write_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| if (CONFIG(TPM_GOOGLE_IMMEDIATELY_COMMIT_FW_SECDATA)) |
| tlcl_cr50_enable_nvcommits(); |
| return safe_write(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_firmware, |
| VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE); |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t antirollback_write_space_kernel(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| /* Learn the expected size. */ |
| uint8_t size = VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_MIN_SIZE; |
| vb2api_secdata_kernel_check(ctx, &size); |
| |
| /* |
| * Ensure that the TPM actually commits our changes to NVMEN in case |
| * there is a power loss or other unexpected event. The AP does not |
| * write to the TPM during normal boot flow; it only writes during |
| * recovery, software sync, or other special boot flows. When the AP |
| * wants to write, it is imporant to actually commit changes. |
| */ |
| if (CONFIG(TPM_GOOGLE_IMMEDIATELY_COMMIT_FW_SECDATA)) |
| tlcl_cr50_enable_nvcommits(); |
| |
| return safe_write(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel, size); |
| } |
| |
| vb2_error_t vb2ex_tpm_clear_owner(struct vb2_context *ctx) |
| { |
| uint32_t rv; |
| printk(BIOS_INFO, "Clearing TPM owner\n"); |
| rv = tpm_clear_and_reenable(); |
| if (rv) |
| return VB2_ERROR_EX_TPM_CLEAR_OWNER; |
| return VB2_SUCCESS; |
| } |