security/vboot: extract secdata_tpm{1,2}.c
Most of the original secdata_tpm.c was TPM2-specific implementation.
Just moving the code around, with trivial tweaks:
- drop now unnecessary #ifdef directives from _factory_initialize_tpm()
- drop leading underscore from _factory_initialize_tpm{1,2}() (external
identifiers should not start with an underscore in C)
- drop unused <security/vboot/tpm_common.h> include and sub-includes of
tss.h which should be considered its part (so this isn't an indirect
inclusion)
- fixed formatting of RETURN_ON_FAILURE() which didn't have slashes
aligned no matter what tab width was used
Change-Id: I0090b748d7d3b2d76a941b87b5885682fd81c4fc
Signed-off-by: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/81415
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/Makefile.mk b/src/security/vboot/Makefile.mk
index 23271ea..48a6c9d 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/Makefile.mk
+++ b/src/security/vboot/Makefile.mk
@@ -118,6 +118,14 @@
verstage-y += secdata_tpm.c
romstage-y += secdata_tpm.c
ramstage-y += secdata_tpm.c
+
+verstage-$(CONFIG_TPM1) += secdata_tpm1.c
+romstage-$(CONFIG_TPM1) += secdata_tpm1.c
+ramstage-$(CONFIG_TPM1) += secdata_tpm1.c
+
+verstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += secdata_tpm2.c
+romstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += secdata_tpm2.c
+ramstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += secdata_tpm2.c
endif
verstage-$(CONFIG_TPM) += tpm_common.c
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c
index f60a5e2..8714dd8 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c
+++ b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c
@@ -5,28 +5,12 @@
* stored in the TPM NVRAM.
*/
-#include <security/vboot/antirollback.h>
-#include <security/vboot/tpm_common.h>
-#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
-#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
-#include <security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_structures.h>
-#include <security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_structures.h>
-#include <vb2_api.h>
#include <console/console.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
+#include <security/vboot/antirollback.h>
+#include <vb2_api.h>
-#define VBDEBUG(format, args...) \
- printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s():%d: " format, __func__, __LINE__, ## args)
-
-#define RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_cmd) do { \
- tpm_result_t rc_; \
- if ((rc_ = (tpm_cmd)) != TPM_SUCCESS) { \
- VBDEBUG("Antirollback: %08x returned by " #tpm_cmd \
- "\n", (tpm_result_t)rc_); \
- return rc_; \
- } \
- } while (0)
-
-static tpm_result_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length);
+#include "secdata_tpm_private.h"
tpm_result_t antirollback_read_space_kernel(struct vb2_context *ctx)
{
@@ -69,529 +53,7 @@
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
-#if CONFIG(TPM2)
-
-static tpm_result_t read_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index, uint8_t *data)
-{
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(index, data,
- HASH_NV_SIZE));
- return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-/*
- * This is used to initialize the TPM space for recovery hash after defining
- * it. Since there is no data available to calculate hash at the point where TPM
- * space is defined, initialize it to all 0s.
- */
-static const uint8_t mrc_hash_data[HASH_NV_SIZE] = { };
-
-/*
- * Different sets of NVRAM space attributes apply to the "ro" spaces,
- * i.e. those which should not be possible to delete or modify once
- * the RO exits, and the rest of the NVRAM spaces.
- */
-static const TPMA_NV ro_space_attributes = {
- .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
-};
-
-static const TPMA_NV rw_space_attributes = {
- .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
-};
-
-static const TPMA_NV rw_auth_space_attributes = {
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
-};
-
-static const TPMA_NV fwmp_attr = {
- .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
-};
-
-/* Attributes for spaces that enable zero-touch enrollment (ZTE) */
-static const TPMA_NV zte_attr = {
- .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
-};
-
-static const TPMA_NV zte_rma_bytes_attr = {
- .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_BITS = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
-};
-
-static const TPMA_NV rw_orderly_counter_attributes = {
- .TPMA_NV_COUNTER = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_ORDERLY = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
- .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1,
-};
-
-/*
- * This policy digest was obtained using TPM2_PolicyOR on 3 digests
- * corresponding to a sequence of
- * -) TPM2_PolicyCommandCode(TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial),
- * -) TPM2_PolicyPCR(PCR0, <extended_value>).
- * where <extended value> is
- * 1) all zeros = initial, unextended state:
- * - Value to extend to initial PCR0:
- * <none>
- * - Resulting PCR0:
- * 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- * - Policy digest for PolicyCommandCode + PolicyPCR:
- * 4B44FC4192DB5AD7167E0135708FD374890A06BFB56317DF01F24F2226542A3F
- * 2) result of extending (SHA1(0x00|0x01|0x00) | 00s to SHA256 size)
- * - Value to extend to initial PCR0:
- * 62571891215b4efc1ceab744ce59dd0b66ea6f73000000000000000000000000
- * - Resulting PCR0:
- * 9F9EA866D3F34FE3A3112AE9CB1FBABC6FFE8CD261D42493BC6842A9E4F93B3D
- * - Policy digest for PolicyCommandCode + PolicyPCR:
- * CB5C8014E27A5F7586AAE42DB4F9776A977BCBC952CA61E33609DA2B2C329418
- * 3) result of extending (SHA1(0x01|0x01|0x00) | 00s to SHA256 size)
- * - Value to extend to initial PCR0:
- * 47ec8d98366433dc002e7721c9e37d5067547937000000000000000000000000
- * - Resulting PCR0:
- * 2A7580E5DA289546F4D2E0509CC6DE155EA131818954D36D49E027FD42B8C8F8
- * - Policy digest for PolicyCommandCode + PolicyPCR:
- * E6EF4F0296AC3EF0F53906480985B1BE8058E0E517E5F74A5B8A415EFE339D87
- * Values #2 and #3 correspond to two forms of recovery mode as extended by
- * vb2api_get_pcr_digest().
- * As a result, the digest allows deleting the space with UndefineSpaceSpecial
- * at early RO stages (before extending PCR0) or from recovery mode.
- */
-static const uint8_t pcr0_allowed_policy[] = {
- 0x44, 0x44, 0x79, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0x3F, 0x5B, 0x15, 0x76, 0x56,
- 0x50, 0xEF, 0x96, 0x98, 0x0A, 0x2B, 0x96, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0x09, 0x04,
- 0x4A, 0x01, 0xB8, 0x5F, 0xA5, 0x4A, 0x96, 0xFC, 0x59, 0x84};
-
-static const uint8_t unsatisfiable_policy[VB2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE] =
- "hmwhat if RBR beat merc in 2021";
-
-static uint32_t define_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, uint32_t length,
- const TPMA_NV nv_attributes,
- const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size)
-{
- tpm_result_t rc;
-
- rc = tlcl2_define_space(index, length, nv_attributes, nv_policy, nv_policy_size);
- if (rc == TPM_CB_NV_DEFINED) {
- /*
- * Continue with writing: it may be defined, but not written
- * to. In that case a subsequent tlcl_read() would still return
- * TPM_BADINDEX on TPM 2.0. The cases when some non-firmware
- * space is defined while the firmware space is not there
- * should be rare (interrupted initialization), so no big harm
- * in writing once again even if it was written already.
- */
- VBDEBUG("%s: %s space already exists\n", __func__, name);
- rc = TPM_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-static tpm_result_t setup_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, const void *data,
- uint32_t length, const TPMA_NV nv_attributes,
- const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size)
-{
- tpm_result_t rc;
-
- rc = define_space(name, index, length, nv_attributes, nv_policy,
- nv_policy_size);
- if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
- return rc;
-
- return safe_write(index, data, length);
-}
-
-static tpm_result_t setup_firmware_space(struct vb2_context *ctx)
-{
- uint32_t firmware_space_size = vb2api_secdata_firmware_create(ctx);
-
- return setup_space("firmware", FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX,
- ctx->secdata_firmware, firmware_space_size,
- ro_space_attributes, pcr0_allowed_policy,
- sizeof(pcr0_allowed_policy));
-}
-
-static tpm_result_t setup_fwmp_space(struct vb2_context *ctx)
-{
- uint32_t fwmp_space_size = vb2api_secdata_fwmp_create(ctx);
-
- return setup_space("FWMP", FWMP_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_fwmp, fwmp_space_size,
- fwmp_attr, NULL, 0);
-}
-
-static tpm_result_t setup_kernel_space(struct vb2_context *ctx)
-{
- uint32_t kernel_space_size = vb2api_secdata_kernel_create(ctx);
-
- return setup_space("kernel", KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel,
- kernel_space_size, rw_space_attributes, NULL, 0);
-}
-
-static tpm_result_t set_mrc_hash_space(uint32_t index, const uint8_t *data)
-{
- if (index == MRC_REC_HASH_NV_INDEX) {
- return setup_space("RO MRC Hash", index, data, HASH_NV_SIZE,
- ro_space_attributes, pcr0_allowed_policy,
- sizeof(pcr0_allowed_policy));
- } else {
- return setup_space("RW MRC Hash", index, data, HASH_NV_SIZE,
- rw_space_attributes, NULL, 0);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * Set up the Zero-Touch Enrollment(ZTE) related spaces.
- *
- * These spaces are not used by firmware, but we do need to initialize them.
- */
-static tpm_result_t setup_zte_spaces(void)
-{
- tpm_result_t rc;
- uint64_t rma_bytes_counter_default = 0;
- uint8_t rma_sn_bits_default[16];
- uint8_t board_id_default[12];
-
- /* Initialize defaults: Board ID and RMA+SN Bits must be initialized
- to all 0xFFs. */
- memset(rma_sn_bits_default, 0xFF, ARRAY_SIZE(rma_sn_bits_default));
- memset(board_id_default, 0xFF, ARRAY_SIZE(board_id_default));
-
- /* Set up RMA + SN Bits */
- rc = setup_space("RMA + SN Bits", ZTE_RMA_SN_BITS_INDEX,
- rma_sn_bits_default, sizeof(rma_sn_bits_default),
- zte_attr,
- unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy));
- if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
- VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to set up RMA + SN Bits space with error %#x\n", __func__, rc);
- return rc;
- }
-
- rc = setup_space("Board ID", ZTE_BOARD_ID_NV_INDEX,
- board_id_default, sizeof(board_id_default),
- zte_attr,
- unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy));
- if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
- VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to set up Board ID space with error %#x\n", __func__, rc);
- return rc;
- }
-
- /* Set up RMA Bytes counter */
- rc = define_space("RMA Bytes Counter", ZTE_RMA_BYTES_COUNTER_INDEX,
- sizeof(rma_bytes_counter_default),
- zte_rma_bytes_attr,
- unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy));
- if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
- VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to define RMA Bytes space with error %#x\n", __func__, rc);
- return rc;
- }
-
- /*
- * Since the RMA counter has the BITS attribute, we need to call
- * TPM2_NV_SetBits() in order to initialize it.
- */
- rc = tlcl2_set_bits(ZTE_RMA_BYTES_COUNTER_INDEX, rma_bytes_counter_default);
- if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
- VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to init RMA Bytes counter space wit error %#x\n",
- __func__, rc);
- return rc;
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * Set up enterprise rollback space.
- *
- * This space is not used by firmware but needs to survive owner clear. Thus, it
- * needs to be created here.
- */
-static tpm_result_t enterprise_rollback_create_space(void)
-{
- uint8_t rollback_space_default[32] = {0};
-
- return setup_space("Enterprise Rollback Space",
- ENT_ROLLBACK_SPACE_INDEX, rollback_space_default,
- sizeof(rollback_space_default), rw_auth_space_attributes,
- unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy));
-}
-
-static tpm_result_t setup_widevine_counter_spaces(void)
-{
- uint32_t index;
- tpm_result_t rc;
-
- for (index = 0; index < NUM_WIDEVINE_COUNTERS; index++) {
- rc = define_space(WIDEVINE_COUNTER_NAME,
- WIDEVINE_COUNTER_NV_INDEX(index),
- WIDEVINE_COUNTER_SIZE,
- rw_orderly_counter_attributes,
- NULL,
- 0);
- if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
- return rc;
- }
- return rc;
-}
-
-static tpm_result_t _factory_initialize_tpm2(struct vb2_context *ctx)
-{
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_force_clear());
-
- /*
- * Of all NVRAM spaces defined by this function the firmware space
- * must be defined last, because its existence is considered an
- * indication that TPM factory initialization was successfully
- * completed.
- */
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_kernel_space(ctx));
-
- /*
- * Define and set rec hash space, if available. No need to
- * create the RW hash space because we will definitely boot
- * once in normal mode before shipping, meaning that the space
- * will get created with correct permissions while still in
- * our hands.
- */
- if (CONFIG(VBOOT_HAS_REC_HASH_SPACE))
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(set_mrc_hash_space(MRC_REC_HASH_NV_INDEX, mrc_hash_data));
-
- /* Define and write firmware management parameters space. */
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_fwmp_space(ctx));
-
- /*
- * Define and write zero-touch enrollment (ZTE) spaces. For ChromeOS devices with
- * Google TPM, these are set up elsewhere via TPM vendor commands.
- */
- if (CONFIG(CHROMEOS) && !(CONFIG(TPM_GOOGLE)))
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_zte_spaces());
-
- /*
- * On TPM 2.0, create a space that survives TPM clear. This allows to
- * securely lock data during enterprise rollback by binding to this
- * space's value.
- */
- if (CONFIG(CHROMEOS))
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(enterprise_rollback_create_space());
-
- /* Define widevine counter space. No need to increment/write to the secure counters
- and are expected to be incremented during the first use. */
- if (CONFIG(VBOOT_DEFINE_WIDEVINE_COUNTERS))
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_widevine_counter_spaces());
-
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_firmware_space(ctx));
-
- return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-tpm_result_t antirollback_read_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index, uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
-{
- if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) {
- VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for hash idx %#x. "
- "(Expected=%#x Actual=%#x).\n", index, HASH_NV_SIZE,
- size);
- return TPM_CB_READ_FAILURE;
- }
- return read_space_mrc_hash(index, data);
-}
-
-tpm_result_t antirollback_write_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
-{
- uint8_t spc_data[HASH_NV_SIZE];
- tpm_result_t rc;
-
- if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) {
- VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for hash idx %#x. "
- "(Expected=%#x Actual=%#x).\n", index, HASH_NV_SIZE,
- size);
- return TPM_CB_WRITE_FAILURE;
- }
-
- rc = read_space_mrc_hash(index, spc_data);
- if (rc == TPM_BADINDEX) {
- /*
- * If space is not defined already for hash, define
- * new space.
- */
- VBDEBUG("TPM: Initializing hash space.\n");
- return set_mrc_hash_space(index, data);
- }
-
- if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
- return rc;
-
- return safe_write(index, data, size);
-}
-
-tpm_result_t antirollback_lock_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index)
-{
- return tlcl2_lock_nv_write(index);
-}
-
-static tpm_result_t read_space_vbios_hash(uint8_t *data)
-{
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, data, HASH_NV_SIZE));
- return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-tpm_result_t antirollback_read_space_vbios_hash(uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
-{
- if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) {
- VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for hash idx %#x. "
- "(Expected=%#x Actual=%#x).\n", VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, HASH_NV_SIZE,
- size);
- return TPM_CB_READ_FAILURE;
- }
- return read_space_vbios_hash(data);
-}
-
-tpm_result_t antirollback_write_space_vbios_hash(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
-{
- uint8_t spc_data[HASH_NV_SIZE];
- tpm_result_t rc;
-
- if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) {
- VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for hash idx %#x. "
- "(Expected=%#x Actual=%#x).\n", VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, HASH_NV_SIZE,
- size);
- return TPM_CB_WRITE_FAILURE;
- }
-
- rc = read_space_vbios_hash(spc_data);
- if (rc == TPM_BADINDEX) {
- /*
- * If space is not defined already for hash, define
- * new space.
- */
- VBDEBUG("TPM: Initializing hash space.\n");
- return setup_space("VBIOS Cache Hash", VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, data, HASH_NV_SIZE,
- rw_space_attributes, NULL, 0);
- }
-
- if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
- return rc;
-
- return safe_write(VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, data, size);
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG(TPM2) */
-
-#if CONFIG(TPM1)
-
-/**
- * Similarly to safe_write(), this ensures we don't fail a DefineSpace because
- * we hit the TPM write limit. This is even less likely to happen than with
- * writes because we only define spaces once at initialization, but we'd
- * rather be paranoid about this.
- */
-static tpm_result_t safe_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size)
-{
- tpm_result_t rc = tlcl1_define_space(index, perm, size);
- if (rc == TPM_MAXNVWRITES) {
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable());
- return tlcl1_define_space(index, perm, size);
- } else {
- return rc;
- }
-}
-
-static tpm_result_t _factory_initialize_tpm1(struct vb2_context *ctx)
-{
- TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS pflags;
- tpm_result_t rc;
-
- vb2api_secdata_firmware_create(ctx);
- vb2api_secdata_kernel_create_v0(ctx);
-
- rc = tlcl1_get_permanent_flags(&pflags);
- if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
- return rc;
-
- /*
- * TPM may come from the factory without physical presence finalized.
- * Fix if necessary.
- */
- VBDEBUG("TPM: physicalPresenceLifetimeLock=%d\n",
- pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock);
- if (!pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock) {
- VBDEBUG("TPM: Finalizing physical presence\n");
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_finalize_physical_presence());
- }
-
- /*
- * The TPM will not enforce the NV authorization restrictions until the
- * execution of a TPM_NV_DefineSpace with the handle of
- * TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK. Here we create that space if it doesn't already
- * exist. */
- VBDEBUG("TPM: nvLocked=%d\n", pflags.nvLocked);
- if (!pflags.nvLocked) {
- VBDEBUG("TPM: Enabling NV locking\n");
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl1_set_nv_locked());
- }
-
- /* Clear TPM owner, in case the TPM is already owned for some reason. */
- VBDEBUG("TPM: Clearing owner\n");
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable());
-
- /* Define and write secdata_kernel space. */
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_define_space(KERNEL_NV_INDEX,
- TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE,
- VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_SIZE_V02));
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_write(KERNEL_NV_INDEX,
- ctx->secdata_kernel,
- VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_SIZE_V02));
-
- /* Define and write secdata_firmware space. */
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_define_space(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX,
- TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK |
- TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE,
- VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE));
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_write(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX,
- ctx->secdata_firmware,
- VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE));
-
- return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG(TPM1) */
-
-static tpm_result_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
+tpm_result_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
{
tpm_result_t rc = tlcl_write(index, data, length);
if (tlcl_get_family() == TPM_1 && rc == TPM_MAXNVWRITES) {
@@ -609,14 +71,10 @@
static uint32_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
{
-#if CONFIG(TPM1)
if (tlcl_get_family() == TPM_1)
- return _factory_initialize_tpm1(ctx);
-#endif
-#if CONFIG(TPM2)
+ return factory_initialize_tpm1(ctx);
if (tlcl_get_family() == TPM_2)
- return _factory_initialize_tpm2(ctx);
-#endif
+ return factory_initialize_tpm2(ctx);
return TPM_CB_CORRUPTED_STATE;
}
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm1.c b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b66b939
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */
+
+#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
+#include <security/vboot/antirollback.h>
+#include <vb2_api.h>
+
+#include "secdata_tpm_private.h"
+
+/**
+ * Similarly to safe_write(), this ensures we don't fail a DefineSpace because
+ * we hit the TPM write limit. This is even less likely to happen than with
+ * writes because we only define spaces once at initialization, but we'd
+ * rather be paranoid about this.
+ */
+static tpm_result_t safe_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size)
+{
+ tpm_result_t rc = tlcl1_define_space(index, perm, size);
+ if (rc == TPM_MAXNVWRITES) {
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable());
+ return tlcl1_define_space(index, perm, size);
+ } else {
+ return rc;
+ }
+}
+
+tpm_result_t factory_initialize_tpm1(struct vb2_context *ctx)
+{
+ TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS pflags;
+ tpm_result_t rc;
+
+ vb2api_secdata_firmware_create(ctx);
+ vb2api_secdata_kernel_create_v0(ctx);
+
+ rc = tlcl1_get_permanent_flags(&pflags);
+ if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * TPM may come from the factory without physical presence finalized.
+ * Fix if necessary.
+ */
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: physicalPresenceLifetimeLock=%d\n",
+ pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock);
+ if (!pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock) {
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: Finalizing physical presence\n");
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_finalize_physical_presence());
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The TPM will not enforce the NV authorization restrictions until the
+ * execution of a TPM_NV_DefineSpace with the handle of
+ * TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK. Here we create that space if it doesn't already
+ * exist. */
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: nvLocked=%d\n", pflags.nvLocked);
+ if (!pflags.nvLocked) {
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: Enabling NV locking\n");
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl1_set_nv_locked());
+ }
+
+ /* Clear TPM owner, in case the TPM is already owned for some reason. */
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: Clearing owner\n");
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable());
+
+ /* Define and write secdata_kernel space. */
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_define_space(KERNEL_NV_INDEX,
+ TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE,
+ VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_SIZE_V02));
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_write(KERNEL_NV_INDEX,
+ ctx->secdata_kernel,
+ VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_SIZE_V02));
+
+ /* Define and write secdata_firmware space. */
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_define_space(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX,
+ TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK |
+ TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE,
+ VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE));
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_write(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX,
+ ctx->secdata_firmware,
+ VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE));
+
+ return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm2.c b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..075e481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */
+
+#include <security/vboot/antirollback.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
+#include <vb2_api.h>
+
+#include "secdata_tpm_private.h"
+
+static tpm_result_t read_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index, uint8_t *data)
+{
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(index, data,
+ HASH_NV_SIZE));
+ return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is used to initialize the TPM space for recovery hash after defining
+ * it. Since there is no data available to calculate hash at the point where TPM
+ * space is defined, initialize it to all 0s.
+ */
+static const uint8_t mrc_hash_data[HASH_NV_SIZE] = { };
+
+/*
+ * Different sets of NVRAM space attributes apply to the "ro" spaces,
+ * i.e. those which should not be possible to delete or modify once
+ * the RO exits, and the rest of the NVRAM spaces.
+ */
+static const TPMA_NV ro_space_attributes = {
+ .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
+};
+
+static const TPMA_NV rw_space_attributes = {
+ .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
+};
+
+static const TPMA_NV rw_auth_space_attributes = {
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
+};
+
+static const TPMA_NV fwmp_attr = {
+ .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+};
+
+/* Attributes for spaces that enable zero-touch enrollment (ZTE) */
+static const TPMA_NV zte_attr = {
+ .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
+};
+
+static const TPMA_NV zte_rma_bytes_attr = {
+ .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_BITS = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
+};
+
+static const TPMA_NV rw_orderly_counter_attributes = {
+ .TPMA_NV_COUNTER = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_ORDERLY = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+ .TPMA_NV_NO_DA = 1,
+};
+
+/*
+ * This policy digest was obtained using TPM2_PolicyOR on 3 digests
+ * corresponding to a sequence of
+ * -) TPM2_PolicyCommandCode(TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial),
+ * -) TPM2_PolicyPCR(PCR0, <extended_value>).
+ * where <extended value> is
+ * 1) all zeros = initial, unextended state:
+ * - Value to extend to initial PCR0:
+ * <none>
+ * - Resulting PCR0:
+ * 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+ * - Policy digest for PolicyCommandCode + PolicyPCR:
+ * 4B44FC4192DB5AD7167E0135708FD374890A06BFB56317DF01F24F2226542A3F
+ * 2) result of extending (SHA1(0x00|0x01|0x00) | 00s to SHA256 size)
+ * - Value to extend to initial PCR0:
+ * 62571891215b4efc1ceab744ce59dd0b66ea6f73000000000000000000000000
+ * - Resulting PCR0:
+ * 9F9EA866D3F34FE3A3112AE9CB1FBABC6FFE8CD261D42493BC6842A9E4F93B3D
+ * - Policy digest for PolicyCommandCode + PolicyPCR:
+ * CB5C8014E27A5F7586AAE42DB4F9776A977BCBC952CA61E33609DA2B2C329418
+ * 3) result of extending (SHA1(0x01|0x01|0x00) | 00s to SHA256 size)
+ * - Value to extend to initial PCR0:
+ * 47ec8d98366433dc002e7721c9e37d5067547937000000000000000000000000
+ * - Resulting PCR0:
+ * 2A7580E5DA289546F4D2E0509CC6DE155EA131818954D36D49E027FD42B8C8F8
+ * - Policy digest for PolicyCommandCode + PolicyPCR:
+ * E6EF4F0296AC3EF0F53906480985B1BE8058E0E517E5F74A5B8A415EFE339D87
+ * Values #2 and #3 correspond to two forms of recovery mode as extended by
+ * vb2api_get_pcr_digest().
+ * As a result, the digest allows deleting the space with UndefineSpaceSpecial
+ * at early RO stages (before extending PCR0) or from recovery mode.
+ */
+static const uint8_t pcr0_allowed_policy[] = {
+ 0x44, 0x44, 0x79, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0x3F, 0x5B, 0x15, 0x76, 0x56,
+ 0x50, 0xEF, 0x96, 0x98, 0x0A, 0x2B, 0x96, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0x09, 0x04,
+ 0x4A, 0x01, 0xB8, 0x5F, 0xA5, 0x4A, 0x96, 0xFC, 0x59, 0x84};
+
+static const uint8_t unsatisfiable_policy[VB2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE] =
+ "hmwhat if RBR beat merc in 2021";
+
+static uint32_t define_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, uint32_t length,
+ const TPMA_NV nv_attributes,
+ const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size)
+{
+ tpm_result_t rc;
+
+ rc = tlcl2_define_space(index, length, nv_attributes, nv_policy, nv_policy_size);
+ if (rc == TPM_CB_NV_DEFINED) {
+ /*
+ * Continue with writing: it may be defined, but not written
+ * to. In that case a subsequent tlcl_read() would still return
+ * TPM_BADINDEX on TPM 2.0. The cases when some non-firmware
+ * space is defined while the firmware space is not there
+ * should be rare (interrupted initialization), so no big harm
+ * in writing once again even if it was written already.
+ */
+ VBDEBUG("%s: %s space already exists\n", __func__, name);
+ rc = TPM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static tpm_result_t setup_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, const void *data,
+ uint32_t length, const TPMA_NV nv_attributes,
+ const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size)
+{
+ tpm_result_t rc;
+
+ rc = define_space(name, index, length, nv_attributes, nv_policy,
+ nv_policy_size);
+ if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
+ return rc;
+
+ return safe_write(index, data, length);
+}
+
+static tpm_result_t setup_firmware_space(struct vb2_context *ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t firmware_space_size = vb2api_secdata_firmware_create(ctx);
+
+ return setup_space("firmware", FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX,
+ ctx->secdata_firmware, firmware_space_size,
+ ro_space_attributes, pcr0_allowed_policy,
+ sizeof(pcr0_allowed_policy));
+}
+
+static tpm_result_t setup_fwmp_space(struct vb2_context *ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t fwmp_space_size = vb2api_secdata_fwmp_create(ctx);
+
+ return setup_space("FWMP", FWMP_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_fwmp, fwmp_space_size,
+ fwmp_attr, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static tpm_result_t setup_kernel_space(struct vb2_context *ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t kernel_space_size = vb2api_secdata_kernel_create(ctx);
+
+ return setup_space("kernel", KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel,
+ kernel_space_size, rw_space_attributes, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static tpm_result_t set_mrc_hash_space(uint32_t index, const uint8_t *data)
+{
+ if (index == MRC_REC_HASH_NV_INDEX) {
+ return setup_space("RO MRC Hash", index, data, HASH_NV_SIZE,
+ ro_space_attributes, pcr0_allowed_policy,
+ sizeof(pcr0_allowed_policy));
+ } else {
+ return setup_space("RW MRC Hash", index, data, HASH_NV_SIZE,
+ rw_space_attributes, NULL, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set up the Zero-Touch Enrollment(ZTE) related spaces.
+ *
+ * These spaces are not used by firmware, but we do need to initialize them.
+ */
+static tpm_result_t setup_zte_spaces(void)
+{
+ tpm_result_t rc;
+ uint64_t rma_bytes_counter_default = 0;
+ uint8_t rma_sn_bits_default[16];
+ uint8_t board_id_default[12];
+
+ /* Initialize defaults: Board ID and RMA+SN Bits must be initialized
+ to all 0xFFs. */
+ memset(rma_sn_bits_default, 0xFF, ARRAY_SIZE(rma_sn_bits_default));
+ memset(board_id_default, 0xFF, ARRAY_SIZE(board_id_default));
+
+ /* Set up RMA + SN Bits */
+ rc = setup_space("RMA + SN Bits", ZTE_RMA_SN_BITS_INDEX,
+ rma_sn_bits_default, sizeof(rma_sn_bits_default),
+ zte_attr,
+ unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy));
+ if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+ VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to set up RMA + SN Bits space with error %#x\n", __func__, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = setup_space("Board ID", ZTE_BOARD_ID_NV_INDEX,
+ board_id_default, sizeof(board_id_default),
+ zte_attr,
+ unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy));
+ if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+ VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to set up Board ID space with error %#x\n", __func__, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* Set up RMA Bytes counter */
+ rc = define_space("RMA Bytes Counter", ZTE_RMA_BYTES_COUNTER_INDEX,
+ sizeof(rma_bytes_counter_default),
+ zte_rma_bytes_attr,
+ unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy));
+ if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+ VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to define RMA Bytes space with error %#x\n", __func__, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Since the RMA counter has the BITS attribute, we need to call
+ * TPM2_NV_SetBits() in order to initialize it.
+ */
+ rc = tlcl2_set_bits(ZTE_RMA_BYTES_COUNTER_INDEX, rma_bytes_counter_default);
+ if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+ VBDEBUG("%s: Failed to init RMA Bytes counter space wit error %#x\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up enterprise rollback space.
+ *
+ * This space is not used by firmware but needs to survive owner clear. Thus, it
+ * needs to be created here.
+ */
+static tpm_result_t enterprise_rollback_create_space(void)
+{
+ uint8_t rollback_space_default[32] = {0};
+
+ return setup_space("Enterprise Rollback Space",
+ ENT_ROLLBACK_SPACE_INDEX, rollback_space_default,
+ sizeof(rollback_space_default), rw_auth_space_attributes,
+ unsatisfiable_policy, sizeof(unsatisfiable_policy));
+}
+
+static tpm_result_t setup_widevine_counter_spaces(void)
+{
+ uint32_t index;
+ tpm_result_t rc;
+
+ for (index = 0; index < NUM_WIDEVINE_COUNTERS; index++) {
+ rc = define_space(WIDEVINE_COUNTER_NAME,
+ WIDEVINE_COUNTER_NV_INDEX(index),
+ WIDEVINE_COUNTER_SIZE,
+ rw_orderly_counter_attributes,
+ NULL,
+ 0);
+ if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+tpm_result_t factory_initialize_tpm2(struct vb2_context *ctx)
+{
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_force_clear());
+
+ /*
+ * Of all NVRAM spaces defined by this function the firmware space
+ * must be defined last, because its existence is considered an
+ * indication that TPM factory initialization was successfully
+ * completed.
+ */
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_kernel_space(ctx));
+
+ /*
+ * Define and set rec hash space, if available. No need to
+ * create the RW hash space because we will definitely boot
+ * once in normal mode before shipping, meaning that the space
+ * will get created with correct permissions while still in
+ * our hands.
+ */
+ if (CONFIG(VBOOT_HAS_REC_HASH_SPACE))
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(set_mrc_hash_space(MRC_REC_HASH_NV_INDEX, mrc_hash_data));
+
+ /* Define and write firmware management parameters space. */
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_fwmp_space(ctx));
+
+ /*
+ * Define and write zero-touch enrollment (ZTE) spaces. For ChromeOS devices with
+ * Google TPM, these are set up elsewhere via TPM vendor commands.
+ */
+ if (CONFIG(CHROMEOS) && !(CONFIG(TPM_GOOGLE)))
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_zte_spaces());
+
+ /*
+ * On TPM 2.0, create a space that survives TPM clear. This allows to
+ * securely lock data during enterprise rollback by binding to this
+ * space's value.
+ */
+ if (CONFIG(CHROMEOS))
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(enterprise_rollback_create_space());
+
+ /* Define widevine counter space. No need to increment/write to the secure counters
+ and are expected to be incremented during the first use. */
+ if (CONFIG(VBOOT_DEFINE_WIDEVINE_COUNTERS))
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_widevine_counter_spaces());
+
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(setup_firmware_space(ctx));
+
+ return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+tpm_result_t antirollback_read_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index, uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
+{
+ if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) {
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for hash idx %#x. "
+ "(Expected=%#x Actual=%#x).\n", index, HASH_NV_SIZE,
+ size);
+ return TPM_CB_READ_FAILURE;
+ }
+ return read_space_mrc_hash(index, data);
+}
+
+tpm_result_t antirollback_write_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
+{
+ uint8_t spc_data[HASH_NV_SIZE];
+ tpm_result_t rc;
+
+ if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) {
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for hash idx %#x. "
+ "(Expected=%#x Actual=%#x).\n", index, HASH_NV_SIZE,
+ size);
+ return TPM_CB_WRITE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ rc = read_space_mrc_hash(index, spc_data);
+ if (rc == TPM_BADINDEX) {
+ /*
+ * If space is not defined already for hash, define
+ * new space.
+ */
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: Initializing hash space.\n");
+ return set_mrc_hash_space(index, data);
+ }
+
+ if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
+ return rc;
+
+ return safe_write(index, data, size);
+}
+
+tpm_result_t antirollback_lock_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index)
+{
+ return tlcl2_lock_nv_write(index);
+}
+
+static tpm_result_t read_space_vbios_hash(uint8_t *data)
+{
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, data, HASH_NV_SIZE));
+ return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+tpm_result_t antirollback_read_space_vbios_hash(uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
+{
+ if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) {
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for hash idx %#x. "
+ "(Expected=%#x Actual=%#x).\n", VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, HASH_NV_SIZE,
+ size);
+ return TPM_CB_READ_FAILURE;
+ }
+ return read_space_vbios_hash(data);
+}
+
+tpm_result_t antirollback_write_space_vbios_hash(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
+{
+ uint8_t spc_data[HASH_NV_SIZE];
+ tpm_result_t rc;
+
+ if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) {
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for hash idx %#x. "
+ "(Expected=%#x Actual=%#x).\n", VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, HASH_NV_SIZE,
+ size);
+ return TPM_CB_WRITE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ rc = read_space_vbios_hash(spc_data);
+ if (rc == TPM_BADINDEX) {
+ /*
+ * If space is not defined already for hash, define
+ * new space.
+ */
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: Initializing hash space.\n");
+ return setup_space("VBIOS Cache Hash", VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, data, HASH_NV_SIZE,
+ rw_space_attributes, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
+ return rc;
+
+ return safe_write(VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, data, size);
+}
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm_private.h b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3fce40d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */
+
+#ifndef __VBOOT_SECDATA_TPM_PRIVATE_H__
+#define __VBOOT_SECDATA_TPM_PRIVATE_H__
+
+#include <console/console.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tis.h>
+#include <vb2_api.h>
+
+#define VBDEBUG(format, args...) \
+ printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s():%d: " format, __func__, __LINE__, ## args)
+
+#define RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_cmd) do { \
+ tpm_result_t rc_; \
+ if ((rc_ = (tpm_cmd)) != TPM_SUCCESS) { \
+ VBDEBUG("Antirollback: %08x returned by " #tpm_cmd "\n", \
+ (tpm_result_t)rc_); \
+ return rc_; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+tpm_result_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length);
+
+tpm_result_t factory_initialize_tpm1(struct vb2_context *ctx);
+
+tpm_result_t factory_initialize_tpm2(struct vb2_context *ctx);
+
+#endif /* __VBOOT_SECDATA_TPM_PRIVATE_H__ */