vboot: Add VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION support
This patch introduces support signing and verification of firmware
slots using CBFS metadata hash verification method for faster initial
verification. To have complete verification, CBFS_VERIFICATION should
also be enabled, as metadata hash covers only files metadata, not their
contents.
This patch also adapts mainboards and SoCs to new vboot reset
requirements.
TEST=Google Volteer/Voxel boots with VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION enabled
Signed-off-by: Jakub Czapiga <jacz@semihalf.com>
Change-Id: I40ae01c477c4e4f7a1c90e4026a8a868ae64b5ca
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/66909
Reviewed-by: Yu-Ping Wu <yupingso@google.com>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
diff --git a/src/include/cbfs_glue.h b/src/include/cbfs_glue.h
index d4fe367..99dc48d 100644
--- a/src/include/cbfs_glue.h
+++ b/src/include/cbfs_glue.h
@@ -13,11 +13,17 @@
* safety, we only need to verify the metadata hash in the initial stage and can assume it stays
* valid in later stages. If TOCTOU safety is required, we may need them in every stage to
* reverify metadata that had to be reloaded from flash (e.g. because it didn't fit the mcache).
+ * Moreover, if VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION and verification are both enabled, then hashing functions
+ * are required during verification stage.
* Note that this only concerns metadata hashing -- file access functions may still link hashing
* routines independently for file data hashing.
*/
#define CBFS_ENABLE_HASHING (CONFIG(CBFS_VERIFICATION) && \
- (CONFIG(TOCTOU_SAFETY) || ENV_INITIAL_STAGE))
+ (CONFIG(TOCTOU_SAFETY) || ENV_INITIAL_STAGE || \
+ (CONFIG(VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION) && \
+ (verification_should_run() || \
+ (verstage_should_load() && \
+ CONFIG(VBOOT_RETURN_FROM_VERSTAGE))))))
#define CBFS_HASH_HWCRYPTO vboot_hwcrypto_allowed()
#define ERROR(...) printk(BIOS_ERR, "CBFS ERROR: " __VA_ARGS__)
diff --git a/src/lib/cbfs.c b/src/lib/cbfs.c
index 4f2d9ca..d2829d1 100644
--- a/src/lib/cbfs.c
+++ b/src/lib/cbfs.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <list.h>
#include <metadata_hash.h>
#include <security/tpm/tspi/crtm.h>
+#include <security/vboot/vboot_common.h>
#include <security/vboot/misc.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -57,7 +58,10 @@
RO CBFS would have been caught when building the mcache in cbfs_get
boot_device(). (Note that TOCTOU_SAFETY implies !NO_CBFS_MCACHE.) */
assert(cbd == vboot_get_cbfs_boot_device());
- die("TODO: set metadata_hash to RW metadata hash here.\n");
+ if (!CONFIG(VBOOT)
+ || vb2api_get_metadata_hash(vboot_get_context(), &metadata_hash)
+ != VB2_SUCCESS)
+ die("Failed to get RW metadata hash");
}
err = cbfs_lookup(&cbd->rdev, name, mdata, &data_offset, metadata_hash);
}
@@ -160,8 +164,14 @@
ERROR("'%s' does not have a file hash!\n", mdata->h.filename);
return true;
}
- if (vb2_hash_verify(vboot_hwcrypto_allowed(), buffer, size, hash)) {
+
+ vb2_error_t rv = vb2_hash_verify(vboot_hwcrypto_allowed(), buffer, size, hash);
+ if (rv != VB2_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("'%s' file hash mismatch!\n", mdata->h.filename);
+ if (CONFIG(VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION) && !vboot_recovery_mode_enabled()
+ && vboot_logic_executed())
+ vboot_fail_and_reboot(vboot_get_context(), VB2_RECOVERY_FW_BODY,
+ rv);
return true;
}
}
diff --git a/src/mainboard/google/asurada/Makefile.inc b/src/mainboard/google/asurada/Makefile.inc
index 601b485..84600b6 100644
--- a/src/mainboard/google/asurada/Makefile.inc
+++ b/src/mainboard/google/asurada/Makefile.inc
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
romstage-y += boardid.c
romstage-y += chromeos.c
romstage-y += regulator.c
+romstage-y += reset.c
romstage-y += romstage.c
romstage-y += sdram_configs.c
diff --git a/src/mainboard/google/cherry/Makefile.inc b/src/mainboard/google/cherry/Makefile.inc
index e1e363c..4edbd38 100644
--- a/src/mainboard/google/cherry/Makefile.inc
+++ b/src/mainboard/google/cherry/Makefile.inc
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
romstage-y += boardid.c
romstage-y += chromeos.c
romstage-y += regulator.c
+romstage-y += reset.c
romstage-y += romstage.c
romstage-y += sdram_configs.c
diff --git a/src/mainboard/google/corsola/Makefile.inc b/src/mainboard/google/corsola/Makefile.inc
index 30ee6c1..d11f6ba 100644
--- a/src/mainboard/google/corsola/Makefile.inc
+++ b/src/mainboard/google/corsola/Makefile.inc
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
romstage-y += boardid.c
romstage-y += chromeos.c
romstage-y += regulator.c
+romstage-y += reset.c
romstage-y += romstage.c
romstage-y += sdram_configs.c
diff --git a/src/mainboard/google/geralt/Makefile.inc b/src/mainboard/google/geralt/Makefile.inc
index 85748dd..006b4f2 100644
--- a/src/mainboard/google/geralt/Makefile.inc
+++ b/src/mainboard/google/geralt/Makefile.inc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
romstage-y += memlayout.ld
romstage-y += chromeos.c
romstage-y += regulator.c
+romstage-y += reset.c
romstage-y += romstage.c
romstage-y += sdram_configs.c
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/Kconfig b/src/security/vboot/Kconfig
index a36510d..93e1845 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/Kconfig
+++ b/src/security/vboot/Kconfig
@@ -35,6 +35,20 @@
help
Have two update partitions beside the RO partition.
+config VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION
+ bool "Enable vboot and CBFS integration"
+ default n
+ depends on VBOOT_SLOTS_RW_A
+ depends on CBFS_VERIFICATION
+ help
+ Say yes here to enable cryptographic verification of RW slots CBFS
+ metadata. This will replace body hash verification.
+
+ This option enables integration of vboot and CBFS. Verification of RW
+ slots is performed by calculation of their CBFS metadata hash.
+ It also requires CBFS_VERIFICATION to be enabled, so that CBFS files
+ contents are correctly verified.
+
config VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS
bool
default n
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/Makefile.inc b/src/security/vboot/Makefile.inc
index bd73871..e4771dd 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/Makefile.inc
+++ b/src/security/vboot/Makefile.inc
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
verstage-y += vbnv.c
romstage-y += vbnv.c
ramstage-y += vbnv.c
+postcar-y += vbnv.c
romstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_EARLY_EC_SYNC) += ec_sync.c
@@ -68,16 +69,19 @@
verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS) += vbnv_cmos.c
romstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS) += vbnv_cmos.c
ramstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS) += vbnv_cmos.c
+postcar-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS) += vbnv_cmos.c
bootblock-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS_BACKUP_TO_FLASH) += vbnv_flash.c
verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS_BACKUP_TO_FLASH) += vbnv_flash.c
romstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS_BACKUP_TO_FLASH) += vbnv_flash.c
ramstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS_BACKUP_TO_FLASH) += vbnv_flash.c
+postcar-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS_BACKUP_TO_FLASH) += vbnv_flash.c
bootblock-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_FLASH) += vbnv_flash.c
verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_FLASH) += vbnv_flash.c
romstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_FLASH) += vbnv_flash.c
ramstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_FLASH) += vbnv_flash.c
+postcar-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_VBNV_FLASH) += vbnv_flash.c
bootblock-y += vboot_loader.c
romstage-y += vboot_loader.c
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/common.c b/src/security/vboot/common.c
index 7f1aee1..1703933 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/common.c
+++ b/src/security/vboot/common.c
@@ -63,8 +63,16 @@
if (ret)
return ret;
- /* Truncate area to the size that was actually signed by vboot. */
- return rdev_chain(fw, fw, 0, vb2api_get_firmware_size(ctx));
+ /*
+ * Truncate area to the size that was actually signed by vboot.
+ * It is only required for old verification mechanism calculating full body hash.
+ * New verification mechanism uses signature with zero data size, so truncation
+ * is not possible.
+ */
+ if (!CONFIG(VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION))
+ return rdev_chain(fw, fw, 0, vb2api_get_firmware_size(ctx));
+
+ return 0;
}
static void vboot_setup_cbmem(int unused)
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/vboot_common.c b/src/security/vboot/vboot_common.c
index 8ecb5d8..dd611d1 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/vboot_common.c
+++ b/src/security/vboot/vboot_common.c
@@ -11,6 +11,11 @@
void vboot_save_data(struct vb2_context *ctx)
{
+ if (!verification_should_run() && !(ENV_ROMSTAGE && CONFIG(VBOOT_EARLY_EC_SYNC))
+ && (ctx->flags
+ & (VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_CHANGED | VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_KERNEL_CHANGED)))
+ die("TPM writeback in " ENV_STRING "?");
+
if (ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_CHANGED &&
(CONFIG(VBOOT_MOCK_SECDATA) || tlcl_lib_init() == VB2_SUCCESS)) {
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Saving secdata firmware\n");
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/vboot_loader.c b/src/security/vboot/vboot_loader.c
index 0acb349..7cda690 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/vboot_loader.c
+++ b/src/security/vboot/vboot_loader.c
@@ -28,15 +28,32 @@
static void after_verstage(void)
{
+ struct vb2_hash *metadata_hash = NULL;
+ struct vb2_context *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (CONFIG(VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION)) {
+ ctx = vboot_get_context();
+ vb2_error_t rv = vb2api_get_metadata_hash(ctx, &metadata_hash);
+ if (rv)
+ vboot_fail_and_reboot(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_FW_PREAMBLE, rv);
+ }
+
vboot_executed = 1; /* Mark verstage execution complete. */
const struct cbfs_boot_device *cbd = vboot_get_cbfs_boot_device();
if (!cbd) /* Can't initialize RW CBFS in recovery mode. */
return;
- enum cb_err err = cbfs_init_boot_device(cbd, NULL); /* TODO: RW hash */
- if (err && err != CB_CBFS_CACHE_FULL) /* TODO: -> recovery? */
- die("RW CBFS initialization failure: %d", err);
+ enum cb_err err = cbfs_init_boot_device(cbd, metadata_hash);
+ if (err && err != CB_CBFS_CACHE_FULL) {
+ if (CONFIG(VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION)) {
+ printk(BIOS_ERR, "RW CBFS initialization failed: %d\n", err);
+ /* CBFS error code does not fit in subcode. Use only lowest byte. */
+ vboot_fail_and_reboot(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_FW_BODY, err & 0xFF);
+ } else {
+ die("RW CBFS initialization failure: %d", err);
+ }
+ }
}
void vboot_run_logic(void)
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/vboot_logic.c b/src/security/vboot/vboot_logic.c
index 660b7da..98a044c 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/vboot_logic.c
+++ b/src/security/vboot/vboot_logic.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
return VB2_SUCCESS;
}
-static int handle_digest_result(void *slot_hash, size_t slot_hash_sz)
+static vb2_error_t handle_digest_result(void *slot_hash, size_t slot_hash_sz)
{
int is_resume;
@@ -63,14 +63,14 @@
* vboot_retrieve_hash(), if Chrome EC is not enabled then return.
*/
if (!CONFIG(EC_GOOGLE_CHROMEEC))
- return 0;
+ return VB2_SUCCESS;
/*
* Nothing to do since resuming on the platform doesn't require
* vboot verification again.
*/
if (!CONFIG(RESUME_PATH_SAME_AS_BOOT))
- return 0;
+ return VB2_SUCCESS;
/*
* Assume that if vboot doesn't start in bootblock verified
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
* lives in RO CBFS.
*/
if (!CONFIG(VBOOT_STARTS_IN_BOOTBLOCK))
- return 0;
+ return VB2_SUCCESS;
is_resume = platform_is_resuming();
@@ -92,12 +92,12 @@
if (vboot_retrieve_hash(saved_hash, saved_hash_sz)) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "Couldn't retrieve saved hash.\n");
- return -1;
+ return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
if (memcmp(saved_hash, slot_hash, slot_hash_sz)) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "Hash mismatch on resume.\n");
- return -1;
+ return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
} else if (is_resume < 0)
printk(BIOS_ERR, "Unable to determine if platform resuming.\n");
@@ -111,10 +111,10 @@
* lead to a reboot loop. The consequence of this is that
* we will most likely fail resuming because of EC issues or
* the hash digest not matching. */
- return 0;
+ return VB2_SUCCESS;
}
- return 0;
+ return VB2_SUCCESS;
}
static vb2_error_t hash_body(struct vb2_context *ctx,
@@ -179,10 +179,7 @@
timestamp_add_now(TS_HASH_BODY_END);
- if (handle_digest_result(hash_digest, hash_digest_sz))
- return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
-
- return VB2_SUCCESS;
+ return handle_digest_result(hash_digest, hash_digest_sz);
}
static uint32_t extend_pcrs(struct vb2_context *ctx)
@@ -236,16 +233,10 @@
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED;
}
-/**
- * Verify and select the firmware in the RW image
- *
- * TODO: Avoid loading a stage twice (once in hash_body & again in load_stage).
- * when per-stage verification is ready.
- */
+/* Verify and select the firmware in the RW image */
void verstage_main(void)
{
struct vb2_context *ctx;
- struct region_device fw_body;
vb2_error_t rv;
timestamp_add_now(TS_VBOOT_START);
@@ -326,7 +317,6 @@
extend_pcrs(ctx); /* ignore failures */
goto verstage_main_exit;
}
-
vboot_save_and_reboot(ctx, rv);
}
@@ -345,12 +335,22 @@
vboot_save_and_reboot(ctx, rv);
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Phase 4\n");
- rv = vboot_locate_firmware(ctx, &fw_body);
- if (rv)
- die_with_post_code(POST_INVALID_ROM,
- "Failed to read FMAP to locate firmware");
+ if (CONFIG(VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION)) {
+ struct vb2_hash *metadata_hash;
+ rv = vb2api_get_metadata_hash(ctx, &metadata_hash);
+ if (rv == VB2_SUCCESS)
+ rv = handle_digest_result(metadata_hash->raw,
+ vb2_digest_size(metadata_hash->algo));
+ } else {
+ struct region_device fw_body;
+ rv = vboot_locate_firmware(ctx, &fw_body);
+ if (rv)
+ die_with_post_code(POST_INVALID_ROM,
+ "Failed to read FMAP to locate firmware");
- rv = hash_body(ctx, &fw_body);
+ rv = hash_body(ctx, &fw_body);
+ }
+
if (rv)
vboot_save_and_reboot(ctx, rv);
vboot_save_data(ctx);
diff --git a/src/soc/mediatek/mt8173/Makefile.inc b/src/soc/mediatek/mt8173/Makefile.inc
index e824e54..7688ecf 100644
--- a/src/soc/mediatek/mt8173/Makefile.inc
+++ b/src/soc/mediatek/mt8173/Makefile.inc
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
romstage-y += memory.c
romstage-y += emi.c dramc_pi_basic_api.c dramc_pi_calibration_api.c
romstage-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_TEST) += ../common/memory_test.c
+romstage-y += ../common/wdt.c ../common/reset.c
romstage-y += ../common/mmu_operations.c mmu_operations.c
romstage-y += ../common/rtc.c rtc.c